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BOOK REVIEWS
SUCH IS WAR’S EFFECT
Hedges, Chris. War Is a Force That Gives Us Meaning. New York: PublicAffairs, 2002. 211pp. $23
Chris Hedges’s timely and moving re-
flection War Is a Force That Gives Us
Meaning is about how war destroys the
people who experience it. He elo-
quently argues throughout his short
book that no one who is caught up in
war ever emerges unscathed or un-
scarred. Hedges wants the reader to see
war for what it is—an evil designed by
humans to empower great violence
against other humans. Hedges depicts
this evil graphically, many times and in
many ways, throughout the book. He
feels compelled to make his case in ex-
tremely stark terms because he knows
that for all its wickedness, war is also a
most addictive psychological and social
drug. Worse, Hedges states, war is
sometimes a necessary evil, a poison
that civilized and humane peoples must
take to defeat horribly deformed na-
tions and peoples who have completely
surrendered their humanity to it.
Hedges knows of what he writes. For
over fifteen years, he covered wars for
various news agencies. He was one of
those reporters who, like Ernie Pyle of a
generation past, travel to the front to
get their stories. Hedges got something
else, for which he had not bargained—
an addiction to the “jag” of combat.
Michael Herr, a reporter during the
Vietnam War, summarized this addic-
tion: “[Under fire] maybe you couldn’t
love the war and hate it inside the same
instant, but sometimes those feelings al-
ternated so rapidly that they spun to-
gether in a strobic wheel rolling all the
way up until you were literally High On
War like it said on all the helmet covers.
Coming off a jag like that could really
make a mess out of you.”
As a “cure” for his addiction, Hedges
spent a year in self-reflection and study
at Harvard; the result is this book. He
argues that war is so attractive because
it provides meaning and purpose to our
lives and fills a void in our existence.
The Faustian bargain is that war also
demands sacrifice—the destruction of
everything and everyone who is impor-
tant to the combatants, including the
culture in which they live.
Hedges would have the reader believe that
war really expresses the Freudian notion
of Thanatos, or death wish—that humans
find meaning in their lives through their
self-sacrifice, through dying. One imme-
diately thinks of the suicide bombers in
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Israel or the hijackers of “9/11.” However,
he argues further that if Freud is correct,
the balance to Thanatos is Eros, or the
love of life. While Thanatos drives hu-
mans to self-annihilation, Eros drives
them to embrace each other with affec-
tion and support. The Freudian view is
that both concepts are real and in eternal
struggle; there can never be a lasting
peace between them.
Hedges closes with a plea: “To survive
as a human being is possible only
through love. And when Thanatos is as-
cendant, the instinct must be to reach
out to those we love, to see them all in
their divinity, pity and pathos of the
human.” Love alone, for the author, has
the ability to overcome human destruc-
tiveness. One feels almost compelled to
regurgitate the Beatles line, “All you
need is love.” Therein lies the serious
weakness of this book. Hedges is con-
vincing in his analysis and reflection on
war but superficial to the point of trivi-
ality about its necessary counterbal-
ance, love. It is as if he remains
addicted to the very thing that he recog-
nizes will destroy him.
Nevertheless, every civilian defense ex-
ecutive, soldier, sailor, Marine, and air-
man should read War Is a Force That
Gives Us Meaning. Those of us who
have known the intimate jag of war also
know its nightmares. Hedges’s work is a
cautionary tale implying that nations
and peoples should enter war most re-
luctantly. It warns that war should be a
last resort, and that tragic consequences
may result even so.
My father made four opposed landings
with MacArthur’s army in the South-
west Pacific theater, each one with the
first assault wave. He was never
wounded. After the war, he worked for
an aerospace company for over forty
years and never missed a day to sick-
ness. Every night, after work, he drank
himself insensate. That is my most sa-
lient memory of him. Now, after my
war, I know that his drinking was a
learned coping behavior that served
him well after each landing. It also got
him through the rest of his life. Such is
war’s effect.
With this book Hedges has rammed the
issue of morality and ethics of war in our
faces. Will we take heed, or simply strike?
JON CZARNECKI
Associate Professor of Joint Maritime Operations
Naval War College, Monterey Program
Henriksen, Thomas H., ed. Foreign Policy for
America in the Twenty-first Century: Alternative
Perspectives. Stanford, Calif.: Hoover Institution
Press, 2001. 152pp. $15
A brief, clean-cutting compendium
with six well known scholarly contribu-
tors, Henriksen’s volume illuminates
the current cardinal directions in the
debate over American foreign policy—
unilateral versus multilateral interven-
tionism along one axis, and aggressive
promotion of democracy (or global
markets) versus conservative harboring
of national strength on the other. Be-
hind this compass hides the more theo-
retical discussion of whether the United
States needs or could possibly maintain
a grand strategy in the absence of an
immediate national security threat.
Henriksen’s own contribution (intro-
duction and chapter 5) is to lay out the
dynamics of the post–Cold War world,
emphasizing the rise of China, threats
from rogue states, a stumbling Russia,
and a series of regional crises that
1 5 8 N A V A L W A R C O L L E G E R E V I E W
2
Naval War College Review, Vol. 56 [2003], No. 3, Art. 9
https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol56/iss3/9
mandate “measured global activism” in
order to protect U.S. national interests.
John Lewis Gaddis stresses the need to
develop a coherent U.S. grand strategy
in the post–Cold War world—primarily
as a tool for managing foreign policy in
a disciplined, proactive fashion rather
than simply responding to crises on a
case-by-case basis. Gaddis argues, “A
country without a strategy is like a mis-
sile without a guidance system. It’s
likely to dissipate resources ineffectually
and spread potential damage far. It can
pose as many risks to those who build
and maintain it as it does to those at
whom it’s supposed to be aimed.”
Gaddis is known as a key historian of
the Cold War. Under current circum-
stances, he sees grand strategy as an
“endangered discipline,” suffering from
a shortage of generalists who under-
stand the “ecology” of the international
environment rather than narrow re-
gional or functional specialties.
Starting the directional debate, Richard
A. Falk argues that American grand
strategy should emphasize strengthen-
ing global economic governance via in-
ternational financial institutions,
support for European Union–type re-
gionalism as a means of international
security, and the transformation of the
United Nations toward a global parlia-
ment. In Falk’s view, all these develop-
ments are in sync with the natural
instinct of America, although thus far
“the United States’ position has exem-
plified the democratic paradox of favor-
ing democracy at the domestic level but
resisting its application at the global
level.” Those familiar with Falk’s writ-
ings over the past four decades, advo-
cating world federalism, might find
these familiar arguments repetitive;
what is unique here is Falk’s lack of
stridency and the absence of the near-
utopian rhetoric that marks his earlier,
longer works.
Larry Diamond, Hoover Institution
scholar and founding coeditor of the
Journal of Democracy, stakes out the ac-
tivist end of the other axis. He insists
that building a world of liberal democ-
racies, whether by unilateral or multi-
lateral means, should be the primary
objective of U.S. grand strategy. Not
only does Diamond subscribe to the
“democratic peace” theory (that real
democracies do not fight each other),
but he also argues that democratic in-
stitutions function as “elixirs” to all so-
cioeconomic ills. Unlike Falk, Diamond
finds the solution for abusive power
and brutality through domestic democ-
ratization rather than in democratizing
international institutions—the latter a
process that (by implication) is at best
moderately helpful and potentially dis-
tracting. At worst, “one nation, one
vote” (or votes cast in international fora
by rulers of people who are not free)
thwarts the process of true (internal)
democratization by allowing authori-
tarian states to subvert the evolving
global trend toward greater individual
freedom. Diamond identifies the Mus-
lim world, rogue states, and China as
having cultural “dilemmas” that resist
much direct U.S. support for demo-
cratic change, but he maintains that
they should remain the particular focus
of U.S. efforts.
Sebastian Edwards, UCLA business pro-
fessor, presents a scholarly defense of
the beneficial aspects of economic glob-
alization and concludes that the United
States must be the driver of free trade
and economic openness throughout
the global system. Pointing to the evi-
dence between openness and income
B O O K R E V I E W S 1 5 9
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distribution, Edwards sees an interna-
tional economic policy supportive of
globalization as a core aspect of U.S.
grand strategy. For Edwards, free capi-
tal is as important as free institutions.
Walter McDougall, Pulitzer Prize–
winning author and professor at the
University of Pennsylvania, simulta-
neously anchors both the unilateral and
noninterventionist ends of the twin
axes by arguing for “contra globaliza-
tion and U.S. hegemony.” His is not a
unilateralism of action but a conserva-
tion of American strength for vital in-
terests, of which strenuous efforts to
establish international institutions is
not one. McDougall also argues against
the need for an articulate and public
American grand strategy, since “strat-
egy is by its nature secretive, deceptive,
and counterintuitive . . . and partly
reactive” and “democracies are ill-
equipped to formulate or execute any
long-term strategy except in time of
war or obvious peril.” In his view, the
quest for a detailed grand strategy leads
nowhere, because quite simply “the
American people don’t want one.” He
equally refutes both the “Clintonian
vision of globalization” and “the neo-
conservative crusade.” America must
carefully husband its international polit-
ical resources (particularly military de-
ployments), since “the world today is in
a highly unnatural state” that will inevi-
tably lead to balance of power politics
and spheres of influence. Continually
strong U.S. economic development is
the soundest policy; since “the most
predictable and direct challenges to
U.S. security are the invasion of illegal
immigrants and drugs, and the prospect
of civil collapse in Colombia, Mexico,
and lands in between,” strengthening
pan-American relations should be the
main focus. As for the rest of the world,
“helping to prevent wars among the big
powers is the most moral task the U.S.
can perform,” a task that does not in-
clude humanitarian crusades, promo-
tion of free trade, or global democracy.
“I am for them, by and large,” states
McDougall, “but I know America can
live without their triumph abroad” and
should not squander vital, limited re-
sources in their pursuit. As in his book
Promised Land, Crusader State: The
American Encounter with the World
since 1776 (Houghton Mifflin, 1997),
McDougall compares the potential out-
come of America’s moral crusades
overseas with that of the ephemeral and
counterproductive results of the medi-
eval Crusades. He concludes that Amer-
icans should “cease calling for the
conversion of all nations in this genera-
tion . . . and husband the assets they will
need when and if strategic genius be-
comes necessary.”
As the most recent outline of America’s
ongoing foreign policy/grand strategy
debate, Foreign Policy for America in the
Twenty-first Century successfully
bridges the gap between one-sided me-
dia op-eds and cautious scholarly
tomes. Appealing to both the interested
citizen and policy specialist alike, this
book indeed delivers on its promise to
bring together major opposing “alter-
native views” in a succinct, highly read-
able way.
SAM J. TANGREDI
Captain, U.S. Navy
Arlington, Virginia
1 6 0 N A V A L W A R C O L L E G E R E V I E W
4
Naval War College Review, Vol. 56 [2003], No. 3, Art. 9
https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol56/iss3/9
Orenstein, Mitchell. Out of the Red: Building Cap-
italism and Democracy in Postcommunist Europe.
Ann Arbor: Univ. of Michigan Press, 2001.
184pp. $60
Historically, most countries first de-
velop a market economy, even under
oppressive conditions, before develop-
ing a democracy. However, the 1989
revolutions in Central and Eastern Eu-
rope produced a counter case—the ini-
tiation of simultaneous democratic and
economic reforms. Many policy makers
and academics outside the region have
recommended that stability lies in a co-
herent and rigid reform plan for all
such states. The United States, for ex-
ample, has suggested and still some-
times emphasizes a “cookie cutter” or
“one size fits all” recommendation for
economic reform, emphasizing stabili-
zation, liberalization, and privatization.
Economic reform, Washington argues,
should be placed above the “whims” of
politics and not fall victim to victories
of the left or right.
Mitchell Orenstein is assistant professor
of political science at the Maxwell
School of Syracuse University, where he
teaches courses on Central and Eastern
Europe, as well as on transitions to
democracy.
In this work, Orenstein tests these pre-
cepts for economic reform in the de-
mocratizing countries of Poland and
the Czech Republic. He asks the hard
question: Were the postcommunist
governments definitely less than demo-
cratic reform minded, hostile to eco-
nomic and market-oriented reforms?
Orenstein’s persuasive findings demon-
strate that the traditional model of the
stick-to-it economic plan may not be
the only answer. Indeed, policy learning
and fine-tuning result from the success-
ful alternation of the political parties in
power in these democracies, even when
a postcommunist party returns to take
control.
For example, some feared that the re-
surgence of a postcommunist govern-
ment in Eastern Europe could lead to a
total backlash of democracy in the re-
gion or, worse, pander populist solu-
tions to ease the pain of economic
restructuring. These fears did not mate-
rialize, and the postcommunists elected
in Poland did not massively change the
economic agenda. There was a slow-
down in some areas of reform when the
SLD, the Polish postcommunist party,
won in 1993, but there was no major at-
tempt to undo economic changes or al-
ter Poland’s Western-oriented path. In
the election of 1997, political power
once again changed, this time swinging
to the right and to Solidarity Electoral
Action. This not only further illustrated
Poland’s economic success despite al-
ternation of power but also showed
how that change resulted in a more effi-
cient and centrist economic policy.
Government officials adapted and re-
sponded creatively to the wants and
needs of the electorate.
Interestingly, it was in Prague that the
traditional neoliberal “cookie cutter”
reforms were implemented and re-
mained unchanged for eight years, be-
tween 1989 and 1997. Orenstein argues
that the Czech Republic was not as suc-
cessful as Poland because of the rigidity
of its reforms and its lack of ability to
change or adapt. He adds the other di-
mension of the Czech economic prob-
lem—vouchers. In the 1990s, in an
attempt at rapid privatization, the
Czech Republic gave citizens vouchers
to restructure nationalized industries.
B O O K R E V I E W S 1 6 1
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The voucher program failed largely be-
cause of government corruption, which
led to a loss of public support.
This book is insightful but incomplete.
Orenstein’s arguments are concise and
persuasive, but he only examines two
cases that neatly support his argument.
Hungary would have been an excellent
additional test, as would have the fledg-
ling economies of the Balkans, where
the process of democratization is af-
fected even more directly by domestic
and international constraints.
With possible entry into the European
Union just around the corner for most
of Central and Eastern Europe, the
United States and Europe must look
carefully at these practical experiments
in democratic and economic liberaliza-
tion. With democracies emerging in
Southeast Asia and perhaps the Middle
East, it is important to develop and test
models of economic reform to see what
works and how best to implement them
in democratizing countries.
EDWARD WAGNER
Watson Institute
Brown University
Boot, Max. The Savage Wars of Peace: Small Wars
and the Rise of American Power. New York: Basic
Books, 2002. 428pp. $30
If the story of the military history of the
United States could somehow be pre-
sented in a single museum, the most
grand and widely visited halls would be
those dedicated to the American Revo-
lution, the Civil War, and World War
II. Less visited, but still of interest,
would be much smaller exhibits de-
voted to World War I, Korea, Vietnam,
and DESERT STORM. Conflicts such as
the War of 1812 and the war with Mex-
ico might rate a single dusty showcase
in some obscure corner. Tucked out of
sight, rarely seen, and all but forgotten
would be cabinets, crates, and cartons
packed with the jumbled stories of bush
wars, expeditions, occupations, paci-
fications, and reprisals—the often
sanguinary and surprising “small wars”
of the U.S. military experience.
Reporter and Wall Street Journal editor
Max Boot provides us with a long-
overdue survey of the all too often
slighted and neglected realm of these
lesser conflicts. His work is of necessity
an overview, but it is eminently read-
able and entertaining. Along the way,
Boot reminds us that the conduct of
these small conflicts is as much an
“American way of war” as that which
mobilizes and employs mass citizen-
armies in protracted combat. Finally,
and perhaps most importantly, Boot
suggests that many of the lessons learned
from these small wars may be applied to
the security dilemmas of today.
This work deserves praise on several
levels. To begin with, Boot has rescued
the history of these conflicts from a re-
grettable level of obscurity (as far as the
general reading public is concerned). As
the merits and limitations of the United
States taking on the role of an imperial
police force are increasingly debated, it
is useful to recall that this is not the first
time America has attempted to do so.
The author has the courage to suggest
that under certain conditions, imperial
police forces may provide a much
higher quality of life for indigenous
people than would otherwise be possi-
ble. Boot notes that Haiti’s greatest pe-
riod of prosperity arguably occurred
during its long occupation by the U.S.
Marine Corps. He also points out that
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the Dominican Republic actually bene-
fited when forcibly placed on a fiscal
diet by the United States. Although the
U.S. Marines were ensuring that nearly
half the Dominican Republic’s revenues
went to repay foreign creditors, their
honesty in disbursing the remainder
was so notable that the country received
more funds than it had under its own
rulers. Boot also points out that
Veracruz reached a record standard of
cleanliness and hygiene, with an atten-
dant improvement in public health,
than it had known previously. Boot re-
minds us that far from resulting in
quagmires of despair and failure, many
of these conflicts have to be seen as U.S.
successes.
There are, however, several criticisms
that might potentially be leveled at this
work. Some may say that like so many
correspondents before him, Boot
excessively admires the U.S. Marines,
extolling their triumphs at the expense
of the other services. However, while
there is no denying that Boot has high
regard for leathernecks, he does provide
ample examples of Navy and Army ac-
tions. It is also important to remember
that the Marines were the service of
choice for the great majority of these
conflicts. A significant portion of the
Marines’ senior leadership in the 1930s
felt that the future of the Corps should
be bound up in mastering the chal-
lenges of these conflicts. This resulted
in the Marines’ Small Wars Manual,
published in 1941. It was later shelved;
Boot believes that it would have bene-
fited the United States in Vietnam had
those in charge read the dusty tome.
Another criticism that might be made
by some is that Boot glosses over the
darker aspects of small wars, focusing
on the successes and personalities. For
example, the first charging of a serving
flag officer with a war crime, the use of
torture to extract information, and mu-
tinies of such U.S. trained units as the
Nicaraguan National Guard were part
of the small-war experience. However,
Boot discusses these events in clear and
unequivocal terms, leaving the reader
to come to grips with how these aspects
of war played in U.S. successes.
What make this book so timely and one
that should be read by almost anyone
with an interest in political-military
issues, are the tie-ins that Boot identi-
fies as existing between the wars of the
past and the realities of the present. Is-
sues such as exit strategies, expected ca-
sualties, the difficulties of working with
local allies, and the complexities of state
building are not things the United
States is facing for the first time. In-
deed, as Boot demonstrates, the nation
has been dealing with these dilemmas
since the beginning of its existence.
Well written, timely, and provocative,
Savage Wars of Peace is well worth
attention.
RICHARD NORTON
Naval War College
Vidal, Gore. Perpetual War for Perpetual Peace:
How We Got to Be So Hated. New York: Thun-
der’s Mouth Press, 2002. 160pp. $10
It would be difficult to find a book on
world affairs more contrary to the opin-
ions of most readers of the Naval War
College Review or other members of the
American national security community
than Gore Vidal’s Perpetual War for
Perpetual Peace.
As a military officer myself, I disagree
with many of Vidal’s assumptions and
B O O K R E V I E W S 1 6 3
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propositions, but the book is worth-
while because it challenges one to think
about inconsistencies and issues in
American foreign policy as well as do-
mestic security. The book is extremely
well written, as one would expect from
a writer of Vidal’s caliber. It is highly
engaging, and most military profes-
sionals interested in American national
security will probably find it easy to
read (although fewer may find it easy to
agree with).
Gore Vidal is a noted novelist, perhaps
one of the most prominent living
American authors. In 1943 he enlisted
in the Navy and served in World War
II, so his background lends relevant ex-
perience in military affairs. He wrote
his commentary shortly after the 11
September attack, but after both Vanity
Fair and The Nation declined it, a ver-
sion of this book was printed in Italy,
where it became a best-seller. After
subsequent publication in Europe,
Vidal was finally able to get the book
published in its present form.
Perpetual War for Perpetual Peace con-
tains seven chapters and an introduc-
tion, but much of the material predates
“9/11,” which is one of the book’s chief
weaknesses. Three chapters were re-
printed from his The Last Empire
(Doubleday, 2001), and these were re-
cycled from earlier articles. Another
chapter, “The Meaning of Timothy
McVeigh,” appeared in the September
2001 issue of Vanity Fair. There are
sparse updates throughout the older
chapters, including asterisked footnotes
and comments, such as one briefly
comparing the Oklahoma City bomb-
ing to “Dark Tuesday” (“9/11”). How-
ever, the meat of the new work appears
in the first chapter, “September 11,
2001 (A Tuesday).”
Vidal’s sharp mind and readable writ-
ing style make his arguments on the
World Trade Center attacks and the af-
termath compelling. For instance, the
declaration of an ambiguous “war” on
terror has been the subject of much dis-
cussion in the pages of foreign affairs
journals and newspaper editorials.
Vidal notes that insurance companies
benefit from a state of war due to ex-
ception clauses in insurance agree-
ments, although previous U.S. case law
has established that “acts of war” can
originate only from “a sovereign na-
tion, not a bunch of radicals.”
Some of his other comments lean more
toward “Swiftian literary exaggeration,”
of which he accuses H. L. Mencken in a
letter to Timothy McVeigh. His por-
trayal of Secretary Donald Rumsfeld
and Vice President Dick Cheney as ea-
ger for a police state seems excessive.
Also, he compares the terrorist attacks
in the United States to such state-
sponsored atrocities as the burning of
the Reichstag (secretly perpetrated by
the Nazi government in order to con-
solidate Hitler’s police power) and
rapes by bogus Vietcong squads to dis-
credit the communist insurgency. This
paranoid proclivity toward conspiracy
theory is revealed in his assertion that
Opus Dei is a conservative Catholic
conspiracy in the United States. He
makes a point about Thomas Jefferson’s
and John Adams’s opposition to Jesuit
activity in America, which is probably
more an indicator of American
anti-Catholic bigotry several hundred
years ago than any prescient warning of
the dangers of religious incursion into
state affairs.
There are, however, several arguments
that are more convincing. Vidal con-
tends that terror attacks caused more
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damage to civil liberties than to the na-
tion’s physical well-being. “Once alien-
ated, an ‘unalienable right’ is apt to be
forever lost.” He documents this asser-
tion with a list of police killings of in-
nocent people in their homes and of
indefensible searches and seizures.
While a reasonable reader may dismiss
these discomforting examples as well
researched exceptions to normal law
enforcement activity in the United
States, Vidal also brings up the chang-
ing nature of the law. He refers to U.S.
v. Sandini (1987), which established
that police were able to seize property
permanently from an individual if the
property has been used for criminal
purposes, even if the individual has had
no involvement with any crime. This
ruling has highly negative implications,
considering that 90 percent of Ameri-
can paper currency has traces of narcot-
ics on it from use in the drug trade.
Vidal also points out a common prob-
lem that is not commonly pondered—
the incidence of homosexual rape in the
U.S. prison system, a violation of the
cruel-and-unusual-punishment clause
of the Bill of Rights. For anyone who
doubts that such punishment is state
sanctioned, Vidal quotes a state attor-
ney general who refers to this practice
in a public statement made in the
course of his official duties. He is remi-
niscent of the military author Colonel
Charles Dunlap, U.S. Army, in his ref-
erences to blatant disrespect to Presi-
dent Bill Clinton on a naval vessel by
seamen, who called Clinton “the Prae-
torian Guard of the Pentagon,” and our
“ruling junta.”
There is one other weakness: the book
fails to address properly the meat of the
issue that its title promises—“how we
got to be so hated.” The Federation of
American Scientists has published a
twenty-page listing of American mili-
tary operations dating from 1948 to
1999, documenting how the United
States (like the nations of Orwell’s
1984) has an “enemy of the month
club” and thus engages in a “perpetual
war” hoping for “perpetual peace.” This
theme is underdeveloped, however, and
Vidal’s discussion of the United States
emphasizes domestic repression, while
his reprinted chapters focus too exclu-
sively on an apology (in the Platonic
sense of an explanation) of Timothy
McVeigh.
Altogether, Perpetual War for Perpetual
Peace presents a provocative argument
that will be of intellectual appeal to
professional military officers. It is ad-
mittedly an alternative perspective, but
it may give members of the American
national security community insight
into how our European allies think, as
well as our Third World adversaries,
who often share Vidal’s perspective.
Vidal’s arguments are intriguing, but
the brevity of the new parts of this
work ultimately leaves his thoughts
incomplete.
MICHAEL MORGAN
Captain, U.S. Army
Jalali, Ali Ahmad, and Lester W. Grau, eds. The
Other Side of the Mountain: Mujahideen Tactics in
the Soviet-Afghan War. Quantico, Va.: U.S. Ma-
rine Corps Studies and Analysis Division. 416pp.
(no price given)
What could be both more poignant and
ludicrous than Commander Abdul Baqi
Balots’s account of his survival of a
firefight in which his closest friend was
killed? “I saw a lot of Soviets coming at
B O O K R E V I E W S 1 6 5
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me and they were all firing (they put
ten bullet holes through my baggy trou-
sers). . . . Habib Noor told me that, un-
less we crossed the stream to the north,
we would not be able to engage the So-
viets. . . . I ran across and jumped but
landed directly into the stream. ‘Oh, Al-
lah,’ I cried, ‘you have killed me with-
out dignity.’ Then I made a big jump, I
don’t know how since even a tank can’t
clear it, but I did and got out of the
stream.”
This episode is recounted in Ali Jalali
and Lester Grau’s book The Other Side
of the Mountain. The two editors are
well known for a sequence of publica-
tions on unconventional warfare going
back to the early 1990s. For those who
follow this field, it is no surprise that
they are employed at the U.S. Army’s
distinguished Foreign Military Studies
Office at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas.
Their highly readable compilation is a
significant contribution to the literature
on guerrilla warfare, and it has im-
mense implications for the contempo-
rary (at this writing) U.S. intervention
in Afghanistan.
The work consists of ninety-two “vi-
gnettes” of tactical action, with a few
longer accounts of more protracted op-
erations, all based on interviews with
mujahideen participants. The book was
inspired by a Russian text used at the
Frunze Combined Arms Academy, de-
tailing Soviet tactical action in Afghani-
stan. Jalali and Grau earlier produced
an English translation of that book un-
der the title The Bear Went Over the
Mountain: Soviet Combat Tactics in Af-
ghanistan (National Defense Univ.
Press, 1996). The Other Side of the
Mountain points out when one of its
short stories covers the same actions or
operations as in Bear, but the works are
not parallel texts.
The present work consists of fourteen
chapters and a conclusion, composed of
two to sixteen stories apiece. Each
chapter illustrates a different type of
tactical combat. There is a short discus-
sion of the tactic before each chapter
and a commentary at the end. This for-
mat has been used in military writing for
many years (such as in the study Infantry
in Battle, edited by George Marshall,
Military History and Publications sec-
tion of The Infantry School, 1934).
However, in recent decades the implicit
analysis this approach provides has
been greatly strengthened by the more
explicit case-study method. If these sto-
ries had been written and presented as
formal case studies, some existing
weaknesses could have been avoided—
the chief one being burying the chapter
“Blocking Enemy Lines of Communica-
tion” halfway through the book, despite
the editors’ and contributors’ amply
demonstrated contention that logistics
dominated the Soviet war in Afghani-
stan and was its chief strategic (not tac-
tical) factor.
The thematic organization of the chap-
ters is a powerful approach, but it
means sacrificing any sense of chrono-
logical development. As a result, there
is little sense of the evolution of
mujahideen tactics during the war or of
their interaction over time with Soviet
tactics, despite occasional references
to such evolution in the chapter com-
mentaries. In fact, the work places
unreasonable expectations on the back-
ground knowledge of the reader. A
summary of the war’s origins, conduct,
and outcome is badly needed. A table
listing each major mujahideen faction,
with its leader, ideology, and sponsors,
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would also be helpful, as these factions
are referred to throughout the narrative.
The book might also have addressed
popular myths or conceptions about
the war—for example, the U.S. view
that distribution of Stinger antiaircraft
missiles to the mujahideen broke the
back of Soviet air support and hence
was the decisive point of the struggle.
The editors at a number of points indi-
cate their disagreement with this view
but never provide a formal rebuttal.
On the other hand, the book capri-
ciously provides detailed background
information on such relatively trivial
points as the official U.S. Army load
weights for mules, Central Asian horses,
and camels.
The book has a strong geographic
bias—most of the actions it describes
are in the vicinity of Kabul or on the
route connecting Kabul and Jalalabad.
Most of the remaining actions are in
the Kandahar area. There is nothing
from the Herat region, or the area
around Mazr-e Sharf, or the Panjshir
Valley. This bias may be explained by a
point the editors make in their intro-
duction, that a number of interviews
could not be completed because of the
1996 Taliban advance on Kabul and the
north. Still, they need to explain how
they have compensated for this imbal-
ance in their material, especially in view
of their own contention that the con-
duct of the war varied by region and by
the ethnicities involved.
There may be an issue in this book with
language as well. Good interpreters are
well aware of the temptation to tidy up
the haphazard use of specialized termi-
nology by speakers of a foreign lan-
guage, by rendering it in precise,
professional English usage. The editors
remark in the introduction that
although their contributors always re-
ferred to “Russians,” they have changed
this throughout to “Soviets.” Did the
same process occur in transcribing the
interviewees’ descriptions of guerrilla
operations? In this book even the most
irregular of mujahideen commanders
seems to have a perfect grasp of U.S.
military terms and phrasing, implying
an equal grasp of the concepts behind
the words.
Unfortunately, the book’s proofing and
editing is distractingly bad, which is a se-
rious handicap in a work containing so
many foreign words and names. An end
sheet includes production credits for the
book—it seems only appropriate that
one is listed for “Book Editing and
Desing.” A particularly unfortunate re-
sult of this hasty editing is found in the
commentary following a chapter on ur-
ban combat. On first reading, this evalu-
ation of a mujahideen bombing of a city
market appears actually to be a defense
of terrorist attacks on civilian noncom-
batants. Closer attention, however,
shows that the editors were attempting
to contrast this particular incident with
the Soviet aerial bombardment cam-
paign aimed at driving the population
from the Afghan countryside, but the
text certainly reads as though it is equat-
ing any air strike with terrorism.
These flaws detract from but do not
negate the high value of this book. In
addition to its major strength of first-
hand accounts of the most significant
guerrilla war of our time, the book has
many other useful features. Its use of
maps is particularly adept, and consis-
tent references to Defense Mapping
Agency map sheets give a sense of detail
and nuance to the work. While it is ex-
ceptionally riddled with typographical
errors, the glossary covers nearly all the
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specialized and foreign terms used in the
book, at exactly the right level of detail.
In sum, The Other Side of the Mountain
is a unique and valuable contribution to
the study of unconventional warfare. In
view of the ongoing U.S. operations in
Afghanistan, the editors would be per-
forming a civic service were they to
produce a revised and reedited version
for general publication.
WILLIAM C. GREEN
Department of Political Science
CSU San Bernardino
Ellsberg, Daniel. Secrets: A Memoir of Vietnam
and the Pentagon Papers. New York: Viking Pen-
guin, 2002. 498pp. $29.95
For Americans who were adults during
the Vietnam War, the name Daniel
Ellsberg is portentous; it either suggests
a whiff of treason or connotes heroic
patriotism. Ellsberg is a Marine Corps
veteran, Harvard Ph.D., former senior
official in the Office of the Secretary of
Defense, a highly regarded analyst for
the RAND Corporation, and a civilian
observer of platoon-level combat in
Vietnam who defiantly chose to “walk
point” with the troops he was observ-
ing. In March 1971, Ellsberg released to
the New York Times a seven-thousand-
page, highly classified Department of
Defense history of American involve-
ment in Vietnam. Covering the war
from the Truman administration
through the Tet offensive of early 1968,
this study became known as “The Pen-
tagon Papers” when the New York
Times began publishing it on 13 June.
Ellsberg’s action earned him federal fel-
ony indictments and a protracted crim-
inal trial. On 11 May 1973 the judge
abruptly dismissed the government’s
case, because in the last few weeks evi-
dence had materialized showing that
agents of the Richard M. Nixon admin-
istration had denied Ellsberg his right
to a fair trial by burglarizing his psychi-
atrist’s office in search of material with
which to blackmail him into not releas-
ing more documents. This revelation
became part of the unfolding drama of
the Watergate scandal, the surreptitious
forced nighttime entry into the Demo-
cratic Party headquarters by the same
agents of the administration. President
Nixon attempted to buy the silence of
one of the burglars, E. Howard Hunt,
with a seventy-five-thousand-dollar
bribe. Facing impeachment for at-
tempting to cover up the break-in,
Nixon wailed about Ellsberg: “The
sonofabitching thief is made a national
hero. . . . And the New York Times gets a
Pulitzer for stealing documents.”
Secrets is a book that must be read by
anyone seeking to understand how the
United States formulates its strategy
and policy. Ellsberg demolishes the
“quagmire” thesis favored by such in-
fluential liberal interpreters as Arthur M.
Schlesinger, Jr. By that interpretation,
beginning with Harry S. Truman up to
the administration of Lyndon B. Johnson,
each president made a deeper commit-
ment of American military power and
clandestine activity, under the convic-
tion that his actions would achieve a
South Vietnamese victory over the in-
vaders from the communist North.
From Ellsberg’s perspective, there was
no quagmire, only endless presidential
deception of Congress and the public,
who were led to believe decade after de-
cade that surely the next step would re-
sult in the successful establishment of a
permanently independent South
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Vietnam. Ellsberg served as the action
officer for Vietnam, reporting person-
ally to John McNaughton, Secretary of
Defense Robert S. McNamara’s princi-
pal assistant for Vietnam. Ellsberg be-
came convinced that every president
knew that his commitments would
prove insufficient to accomplish the
goal of preserving South Vietnam’s in-
dependence. However, none of them
could withdraw American support—
because a communist victory in South
Vietnam would create an unbearable
political liability in the Cold War climate
of “wars of national liberation” backed
by the Soviets and China.
Ellsberg went to work as McNaughton’s
aide for Vietnam on 4 August 1964.
On that day his office was receiving
live reports of North Vietnamese
patrol-boat attacks on the U.S. de-
stroyer Maddox, the presence of which
off North Vietnam was one of several
provocations staged by the Johnson
administration to elicit a military reac-
tion from Hanoi. The administration
publicly claimed that two distinct sets
of attacks were made, first on the
Maddox and a short time later on the
Maddox and a sister ship, USS Turner
Joy. Drawing on his direct experience
in the Office of the Secretary of De-
fense, Ellsberg demonstrates that Mad-
dox’s skipper raised doubts about the
second set of attacks within a few hours
of announcing them. The Johnson ad-
ministration nonetheless went to Con-
gress describing both attacks as bona
fide, because together they appeared to
justify a long-planned escalation of the
air war. Once armed by Congress with
the Gulf of Tonkin Resolution, Johnson
made a few direct retaliatory air strikes
and then posed as the presidential peace
candidate. He was running against
Republican Barry Goldwater, who was
advocating precisely the kind of sus-
tained air campaign that Johnson had
already planned and would begin once
safely reelected president.
One can applaud or condemn Daniel
Ellsberg for what he did in 1971. What
one cannot do is ignore the power his
memoir has to inform Americans about
how the executive branch conducted its
foreign policy and military strategy
from the 1940s until 1974. As the
United States apparently heads (at this
writing) toward another major war, the
skeptic is entitled to wonder if things at
the top have really changed.
KEN HAGAN
Professor of Strategy
Naval War College—Monterey, California
Rohwer, Jürgen, and Mikhail S. Monakov. Sta-
lin’s Ocean-Going Fleet: Soviet Naval Strategy and
Shipbuilding Programmes, 1935–1953. Portland,
Ore.: Frank Cass, 2001. 334pp. $57.50
The collapse of the Soviet Union and
the opening of major Russian archives
have provided an opportunity to add
greatly to our understanding of the
character of the Soviet navy. Eminent
researchers Jürgen Rohwer and Mikhail
S. Monakov have contributed much to
this understanding with their study of
Soviet naval shipbuilding and strategy
when Josef Stalin controlled the devel-
opment of the Soviet Navy, from 1935
until his death in 1953. They have un-
covered extensive details of the massive
shipbuilding program, most of which
never came to fruition. Strategy, how-
ever, remains as murky as ever. This
study complements but does not re-
place Monakov’s series of articles on
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Soviet naval doctrine and Stalin’s fleet
in Morskoi sbornik, 1992–98, or Robert
W. Herrick’s Soviet Naval Theory and
Policy: Gorshkov’s Inheritance (1989).
At the end of 1935 Stalin personally
yanked the Soviet navy from littoral de-
fense through air, submarine, and light
surface forces into a grandiose ship-
building program centered on large
battleships and battle cruisers, while
retaining “Young School” craving for
submarines. Stalin took naval strategy
into his own hands but never divulged
any strategic precepts or plans to his
naval leaders, who in fear of Stalin’s
wrath dutifully adapted themselves to
the imposed scheme, several falling to
the purges anyway. The result was a
massive shipbuilding program and a
naval officer corps stranded in a strate-
gic wilderness, with silent misgivings
about the apparent dissonance between
the projected force structure and opera-
tional commitments arising from the
Soviet Union’s particular geostrategic
position.
By 1939 an immense program had
evolved to build twenty-four powerful
battleships by 1947, with fifteen for the
Pacific Fleet and the rest divided among
the Baltic, Black Sea, and Northern
Fleets. Concurrent plans called for a
submarine force intended to reach 438
units, of which 219 were earmarked for
the Pacific. These fleet goals, along with
a modicum of light surface forces, were
impossible for Soviet shipbuilding ca-
pacity, even by halting merchant ship
construction. With the onset of the
Great Patriotic War, all long-term proj-
ects were suspended; only submarine
and light surface projects continued, as
circumstances allowed. The defeat of
the Axis saw the prewar schemes re-
duced to three battleships and three
battle cruisers, all of which were cancel-
led when Stalin died. The Sverdlov-class
cruisers and a new submarine force of
284 boats became the shrunken legacy
of Stalin’s naval dreams.
The navy of Admiral Nikolai
Kuznetsov, under army operational
control but without strategic direction
from the General Staff or the top, con-
tinued to orient itself before, during,
and after World War II toward tradi-
tional defensive roles—defeating at-
tacking enemy fleets and amphibious
expeditions in the near seas—with only
a limited submarine offensive on adja-
cent enemy sea lines of communica-
tions.
Stalin’s motive for building a battleship
fleet, according to the authors, was the
vision of the Soviet Union gaining su-
premacy in the four near seas and then
becoming an oceanic power, with the
battleship or battle cruiser “a symbol
of the highest grade of power, a most
powerful and mobile instrument of
power politics, that the world had
ever known,” the direct predecessor of
the atomic bomb in attaining super-
power status.
Stalin, however, left no direct evidence
of his reasons, whereas several indica-
tors point toward a dominant mental
construct of positional strategic de-
fense still guiding Stalin and his admi-
rals. He and his naval leaders agreed
on a defense strategy but diverged on
preferred force structure. Stalin re-
jected the aircraft carrier, despite all
the evidence from the Second World
War of the importance of airpower at
sea for a blue-water navy. Kuznetsov
often pleaded in vain with Stalin for
stronger shipboard antiaircraft de-
fenses on ships, for aircraft carriers to
cover surface forces from enemy air
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attack out to three hundred miles from
naval bases, and to limit Soviet
land-based air support. In 1946,
Kuznetsov’s close associate Admiral
Vladimir Alafuzov developed a posi-
tional scheme of supremacy under
land-based air cover up to one hun-
dred miles from naval bases, and con-
ditional sea control by large surface
vessels with limited air support in a
“far zone” out to three hundred miles.
This fell short of command of the ex-
panses of the Barents, Baltic, and Black
Seas or of most of the Sea of Japan.
Only submarines with long endurance
could operate in the open ocean, but
Stalin preferred medium submarines,
conceived for operations in near seas
against an amphibious threat. The pro-
jected battleships would have had an
operational radius only half that of
their contemporaries in oceanic na-
vies. Only current Italian battleships,
also designed for near seas, had such
limited autonomy. To operate across
the open ocean was a ludicrous con-
cept to Stalin in 1945, arguing for a
defensive posture for at least ten to fif-
teen years to come. Stalin’s projected
“large sea and oceanic navy,” to use
the Soviet term, was likely created for
a hoped-for more robust traditional
strategic defensive in contiguous seas.
The evidence in this book, if not its
title, lends support to Herrick’s judg-
ment of a Stalinist strategy of limited
command of the near seas. To suggest
that it was “the first step on the road
to global naval power,” as does series
editor Holger Herwig in the preface,
would require Stalin and his navy to
demonstrate a conceptual leap for
which neither had shown a proclivity.
Mind-sets resist change. Even in the
navy of Admiral Sergei Gorshkov, who
inherited Stalin’s schemes and built up
Kuznetsov’s fleet, extensive deploy-
ments did not replace deeply held
positional and defensive assumptions.
Had Stalin’s “oceanic” fleet actually
been built, whether a shift of orienta-
tion by him or his admirals toward
“global naval power” would have oc-
curred remains undemonstrated and
problematic.
WILLARD C. FRANK, JR.
Old Dominion University
Buker, George E. The Penobscot Expedition: Com-
modore Saltonstall and the Massachusetts Conspir-
acy of 1779. Annapolis, Md.: Naval Institute Press,
2002. 195pp. $32.95
In the various history books on the
American Revolution, the Penobscot
expedition is rarely mentioned in any
detail, being overshadowed by the more
widely known and successful battles
and campaigns. Perhaps this is due to
the dismal outcome of this early joint
amphibious operation and to the desire
by some, especially Massachusetts poli-
ticians of the time, to forget what had
happened.
This hastily conceived expedition was
launched from Boston in July 1779. The
expedition was given the task of ex-
pelling the mounting British military
presence on coastal Maine, centered
around Penobscot Bay, but specifically
at Castine. The expedition set off with
full expectation of success on the part
of the Massachusetts political leader-
ship. But from the beginning, the force
assembled was hampered by inadequate
leadership, divided command author-
ity, poor training and support, and a
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significant lack of understanding of the
tactical situation. In this book, George
Buker, a retired Navy commander, pro-
fessor of history, and an accomplished
author, provides a significant account
of this much overlooked effort by the
combined forces of the Massachusetts
and Maine militia, Continental Navy
and Marines, and various privateer
groups. Buker also provides an interest-
ing glimpse of the internal politics and
personalities of the colonies, especially
in Massachusetts during the American
Revolution. He further provides a com-
plementary argument that the Massa-
chusetts political authorities, when
confronted with the dismal failure of
the expedition, set in motion an inquiry
that may have been a conspiracy of po-
litical self-interest.
The book appears well researched, with
significant endnotes and bibliography.
Reading almost like a novel, it tells the
story of the Penobscot expedition in
great detail and addresses the issues that
led up to its failure and the resulting in-
quiry. In appropriately titled chapters
Buker provides a historical overview
leading up to the expedition, including
the British policy, orders for military
operations along coastal Maine, and,
of course, the colonial response to the
threat to the extended territory of
Massachusetts, now the state of Maine.
As expected, the majority of the book
deals with the actual operations, from
outfitting and the order of battle to the
assaults and resulting siege at Castine,
to the hasty retreat and then rout of co-
lonial forces when superior Royal Navy
forces arrived, and finally to the sequel,
in which the expedition’s personnel
walked back to Massachusetts from
Maine after burning their ships. After
the failure of the expedition and the
loss of almost forty ships, recrimina-
tions were made against various leaders,
including allegations against naval force
commander Captain Dudley Saltonstall
of responsibility for the overall result;
and against Paul Revere, an icon of the
Revolutionary War who served in the
expedition as a lieutanant colonel in
charge of the artillery, of unsoldierly
conduct. In the end, it was Captain
Saltonstall who bore the brunt of the
smear campaign by Massachusetts poli-
ticians to shift the blame.
In the final chapters, and through the
lens of history, Buker argues that in-
deed a conspiracy by the Massachusetts
politicians, through their committee of
inquiry, manipulated the results of their
investigation and attempted to influ-
ence the outcome of the court-martial
of Saltonstall by Continental Navy au-
thorities. Their efforts ensured the de-
sired results of exonerating their native
son, militia general Solomon Lovell,
and provided the justification needed to
assess the Continental government for a
portion of the monetary cost. Buker,
however, provides technical and tactical
reasons that may have led to the failure
of the expedition. Further, he indicates
that only Captain Saltonstall fully ap-
preciated the tactical and operational
circumstances, as well as the limited ca-
pability of his resources and ships in the
confined waters around Penobscot Bay.
These considerations were evidently ex-
cluded or ignored by the politicians in
their single-minded desire to find a
scapegoat for the failure.
Overall, this is a fine historical account-
ing of this chapter in American history.
My one large criticism is that the one
simple map provided is inadequate for
a full understanding of the operations.
This reviewer has the benefit of having
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been stationed in Castine, Maine, and is
geographically aware of the area; I have
walked the earthen ramparts of Fort
George and the various other entrench-
ments around Castine. It would have
been most helpful to the general reader
had additional detailed military maps
been included with each phase of the
expedition. Well placed photographs of
the area would have further added to
the historical understanding of the
events, as would photos of the various
earthworks, trenches, the defensive
canal, and Fort George, which all still
exist as historical landmarks.
JAMES B. GOODMAN
Commander, U.S. Navy
Naval War College
West, Bing. The Pepperdogs. New York: Simon &
Schuster, 2002. 365pp. $25
The Pepperdogs ranks with The Hunt for
Red October. It is a work of fiction con-
structed around reality, brimming with
action and genuine insight into the
emerging warfighting capabilities of the
new ground soldier. West develops his
story around a Marine reconnaissance
team. That team, the “Pepperdogs,” is
made up of six reservists of varying ci-
vilian backgrounds; all have extraordi-
nary courage, physical and mental
strength, expert tactical skills, and total
team commitment.
The Pepperdogs set out on their own to
rescue a team member captured by
rogue Serbian guerrillas who specialize
in casual atrocities. West’s story takes
place in Kosovo, mostly in mountainous
terrain and in the harshest of winter
conditions. In pursuit of the kidnappers
the team undergoes nearly constant
attack, endures brutal weather, and cre-
ates an increasingly difficult political
situation for senior national security
leaders who believe the Pepperdogs are
risking diplomatic solutions. There is at
one point the suggestion that even the
murder of one Marine would not be
worth upsetting diplomatic peace ini-
tiatives. The Pepperdogs make political
matters worse by leaving a path of de-
struction while ignoring direct orders
to end their chase.
Setbacks are many, but perseverance
and tactical teamwork always (well, al-
most always) gets them out of tight
spots. One remembers those great mo-
ments when the cavalry arrived and
everyone cheered. But this team is dif-
ferent from the cavalry; the Pepperdogs
take performance-enhancing drugs and
rarely need to rest. One team member
creates an Internet website that pro-
vides the public with real-time informa-
tion on their progress and problems.
The public cheers them on, reducing
the policy-making flexibility of political
leaders. West skillfully introduces the
Internet as a source of potential direct
information from individuals in the
battle to the public. That information
would have obvious constraining effects
on future national security decision-
making latitude and would yield differ-
ent perspectives on progress and
problems.
The suspense and many sudden turns
of fortune keep the reader glued to the
story. One cannot help but choose sides
between the Marine team and political
leaders who wish to halt the pursuit of
the kidnapped Marine. Even if the team
succeeds and its members become pub-
lic heroes, they may be court-martialed
for disobeying orders.
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Bing West is well qualified to write an
insider’s story of modern small-unit
tactics, having had experience of Oval
Office–level decision making and the
conflicts faced by senior military leaders
between political direction and unnec-
essarily risky situations. West was a Ma-
rine reconnaissance leader in Vietnam
and has studied small-unit action since
the 1960s. He was a Naval War College
professor and a former assistant
secretary of defense. West has main-
tained a close relationship with the Ma-
rine Corps through his design of
combat decision-making simulations.
The Pepperdogs is a great read—as was,
by the way, West’s earlier Vietnam-
centered book The Village (Pocket
Books, 2003, paperback).
WILLIAM E. TURCOTTE
Professor Emeritus
Naval War College
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